Skip to main content

Qian Ge

Qian Ge
PhD Student

Research Interests

Qian is a fourth year PhD student who is working on eliminating timing side channels from seL4 with lightweight countermeasures. Qian is supervised by Prof. Gernot Heiser and Assoc. Prof. Kevin Elphinstone.

Contact Details

Phone: +61 2 9490 5982
Email:Qian.Ge@data61.csiro.au

More contact information is available at the Contact page.

Photo of Qian Ge

Publication List


We investigate kernel mechanisms for enforcing system security policies. In particular, we investigate kernel mechanisms for eliminating timing side channels that are general and minimal enough to merit inclusion into a general-purpose production version of the kernel (i.e. one not only meant for deployments where timing channels are a concern). I am designing kernel mechanisms in seL4. seL4 is a capability based general-purpose microkernel. The design goal of seL4 is to provide a minimal set of mechanisms for high assurance systems, forming a good platform for system security research. Furthermore, we expect that our contributions will benefit not only seL4 but also other kernels or hypervisors.

Projects

Current

Past

Recognition and Awards

Google PhD Fellowship in Systems

Publications

Data61 Papers

2016

Abstract PDF Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, David Cock and Gernot Heiser
A survey of microarchitectural timing attacks and countermeasures on contemporary hardware
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering, Volume -, pp. 1-27, December, 2016

NICTA Papers

2016

Abstract PDF Fangfei Liu, Qian Ge, Yuval Yarom, Frank Mckeen, Carlos Rozas, Gernot Heiser and Ruby B Lee
CATalyst: defeating last-level cache side channel attacks in cloud computing
IEEE Symposium on High-Performance Computer Architecture, pp. 406-418, Barcelona, Spain, March, 2016

2015

Abstract PDF Yuval Yarom, Qian Ge, Fangfei Liu, Ruby B. Lee and Gernot Heiser
Mapping the Intel last-level cache
The Cryptology ePrint Archive, September, 2015
Abstract PDF Fangfei Liu, Yuval Yarom, Qian Ge, Gernot Heiser and Ruby B Lee
Last-level cache side-channel attacks are practical
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pp. 605-622, San Jose, CA, US, May, 2015

2014

Abstract PDF David Cock, Qian Ge, Toby Murray and Gernot Heiser
The last mile: An empirical study of some timing channels on seL4
ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, pp. 570-581, Scottsdale, AZ, USA, November, 2014

Served by Apache on Linux on seL4.